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After decades of steady decline and a subse-
quent relaxation of infection control practices in
health-care facilities, the number of tuberculosis
(TB) cases has been increasing dramatically in
the United States (1) and Western Europe (2) since
1985; the increase is due to human immuno-
deficiency virus (HIV) infection, immigration,
poverty, homelessness, and drug addiction.
Epidemiologic studies have shown that pri-
mary pulmonary TB is caused by inhaling the
tubercle bacillus in a droplet nucleus form (3).
Airborne contagion is crucial in the indoor
transmission of all respiratory infections from
person to person (4,5). Infective persons may
contaminate the air by coughing, sneezing, and
spitting (4,5), which generate a large number of
small respiratory droplets that evaporate almost
instantly into small droplet nuclei, disperse into
the environment, and implant themselves in the
lung when inhaled (4). Droplet nuclei have a
leading role in airborne contagion (3-5).
Outbreaks of TB have been reported from
prisons, nursing homes, residential centers for
HIV-infected persons, urban homeless shelters,
aircraft, schools, and bars. All outbreaks
occurred under crowded living conditions with
prolonged close exposure to an infectious person.
Nosocomial TB transmission is also associated
with cough-generating procedures (6), broncho-
scopy (7), endotracheal intubation and suctioning
(8), open abscess irrigation (9), and autopsy (10).
Workers involved in such procedures are at high
and increasing risk for TB (11) because of the
resurgence of the disease, the emergence of
multidrug-resistant (MDR) strains causing out-
breaks in hospitals among patients and health-
care workers, and compromised TB control due
to decreased funding of health-care agencies
responsible for TB control.
After studying hospital outbreaks that resul-
ted in TB transmission to health-care workers,
various authorities have recommended measures
to prevent nosocomial TB transmission (12-15).
The implementation of a TB infection control
program requires risk assessment and develop-
ment of a TB infection control plan including
early identification, treatment, and isolation of
infectious TB patients; effective engineering
controls (environmental controls such as general
ventilation, high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA]
filters, or ultraviolet germicidal irradiation
[UVGI]); the adoption of appropriate respiratory
protection (surgical masks and particulate
respirators such as HEPA masks); health-care
worker TB training, education, counseling, and
screening; and evaluation of the program’s
effectiveness (13). Several reviews of environ-
mental control measures and respiratory protective
Using a Mathematical Model to Evaluate
the Efficacy of TB Control Measures
Laura Gammaitoni and Maria Clara Nucci
University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy
Address for correspondence: Maria Clara Nucci, Dipartimento
di Matematica, Università di Perugia, 06123 Perugia, Italy;
fax: 011-39-75-585-5024; e-mail: nucci@unipg.it.
We evaluated the efficacy of recommended tuberculosis (TB) infection control
measures by using a deterministic mathematical model for airborne contagion. We
examined the percentage of purified protein derivative conversions under various
exposure conditions, environmental control strategies, and respiratory protective
devices. We conclude that environmental control cannot eliminate the risk for TB
transmission during high-risk procedures; respiratory protective devices, and par-
ticularly high-efficiency particulate air masks, may provide nearly complete protection if
used with air filtration or ultraviolet irradiation. Nevertheless, the efficiency of these
control measures decreases as the infectivity of the source case increases. Therefore,
administrative control measures (e.g., indentifying and isolating patients with infectious
TB) are the most effective because they substantially reduce the rate of infection.336 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 3, July–September 1997
Synopses
devices are available (16-20). Implementing
recommended measures would require massive
expenditures in all hospitals that admit TB
patients. At several hospitals where MDR-TB out-
breaks have occurred, measures similar to those
recommended in TB prevention guidelines have
been implemented. Such implementation halted
and prevented MDR-TB transmission to health-
care workers and patients (21-23), but which of
the many implemented control measures played
a key role in reducing risk is not clear. However,
data suggest that implementing administrative
control measures, in particular identifying and
isolating patients with infectious TB, sub-
stantially reduces the risk for transmission (22).
In this article, we review the most
important TB infection control measures and
evaluate their efficacy in various settings by a
deterministic mathematical model for airborne
contagion (24). The model describes how a
person can become infected by staying in a
room where a source of airborne infection and
an air disinfection device are present.
Two existing mathematical models describe
the propagation of airborne contagion indoors.
The first model was developed in 1955 by William
F. Wells (4), who introduced the so-called
quantum theory. Wells defined a quantum to be
the number of infectious droplet nuclei required
to infect 1 - 1/e of susceptible persons. His ninth
postulate states, “The response to inhaled drop-
let nuclei contagium is quantal; the Poisson
equation expresses reasonably well the relation
between dosage and initial response, a quantum
infecting 63.2% of homogeneously exposed hosts
by definition.” Wells explains, “When on the
average one animal breathes one quantum,
(omissis) 36.8% of the animals will survive, since
this is the fraction whose negative natural
logarithm is 1. Thus 1 quantum of contagium has
been breathed per animal when 63.2% of the
animals become infected (4, p. 124).” In 1978,
Edward R. Riley, G. Murphy, and Richard L.
Riley elaborated another model (25), which deals
with the probability of a susceptible person
becoming infected by inhaling a quantum of
infection. They used the Reed Frost modification
of the Soper equation for airborne transmission
and Poisson’s law of small chances. This model
contains Wells’ model as a particular case.
Our model is based on Wells’ experiments
and postulates and includes the Riley/Murphy/
Riley model as a particular case (24). In this
article, we describe some of the most important
TB infection control measures, such as environ-
mental controls and respiratory protective devices,
and review recommendations made by various
agencies and organizations. Then, we consider
four recent TB outbreaks during which health-
care workers became infected while performing
bronchoscopy, jet irrigation of a thigh abscess,
autopsy, and intubation. Using our deterministic
mathematical model, we simulate the adoption of
different environmental control strategies and
respiratory protective devices, and we give the
number of purified protein derivative (PPD) con-
versions predicted to occur under various exposure
conditions. Moreover, we use our mathematical
model to evaluate the efficacy of administrative
control measures by analyzing data related to
PPD conversions found on an HIV ward before
and after implementing such control measures.
Environmental Control Strategies and
Respiratory Protective Devices
A TB infection control program should be
based on control measures that address the most
important factors involved in TB transmission:
the concentration of droplet nuclei in the air and
the rate at which droplet nuclei are inhaled by
susceptible persons. The concentration of infec-
tious droplet nuclei in the air can be reduced by
environmental controls. These controls include
diluting and removing contaminated air by general
ventilation and air cleaning by air filtration (e.g.,
through HEPA filters) or UVGI.
In general ventilation systems, uncon-
taminated supply air mixes with contaminated
room air (dilution), which is subsequently removed
from the room by the exhaust system (removal).
Two types of general ventilation systems can be
used for dilution and removal of contaminated
air: single-pass systems and recirculating sys-
tems. In single-pass systems the supply air is
uncontaminated fresh outside air, and after it
passes through the ventilated area, 100% of that
air is exhausted to the outside. In a recirculating
system, a small portion of the exhaust air is
discharged to the outside and is replaced with
fresh outside air, which mixes with the portion of
exhaust air that was not discharged to the
outside. The resulting mixture, which can
contain a large proportion of contaminated air, is
then recirculated. The rate at which airborne
particles are removed from an enclosed space
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as the number of air changes per hour (ACH),
which is the ratio between the volume of air
entering the room per hour and the room volume.
A minimum of 6 ACH is recommended for TB
isolation rooms and treatment rooms (26-28).
Where feasible, this airflow rate should be
increased to 12 ACH or more, and in areas where
the nature of work is exceptionally hazardous,
such as autopsy rooms, airflow rates of 15-25
ACH have been recommended (29,30).
HEPA filtration units or UVGI can be used as
a supplement to ventilation control measures in
settings where adequate airflow cannot be pro-
vided with the general ventilation system alone
(13). HEPA filters have a demonstrated and
documented minimum removal efficiency of
99.97% of particles whose diameter is ³ 0.3 mm
(droplet nuclei are an estimated 1 to 5  mm in size
[13], but they can have an aerodynamic diameter
of less than 1 mm [31]). They can be used in fixed
or portable HEPA recirculation systems that can
achieve 12 ACH or more (13). UVGI can kill or
inactivate tubercle bacilli under experimental
conditions (32), especially where air mixing is
accomplished mainly by convection (13). The
effect of UVGI in a room without supplemental
ventilation (33) and in another with a ventilation
rate of 6 ACH (34) is estimated at 10 and 39 ACH,
respectively. Greater rates of ventilation may
decrease the killing of bacteria (34), but the
optimal relationship between ventilation and
UVGI is not known. However, general ventilation
plus UVGI has a disinfection rate of 45 ACH if
properly installed (34).
Personal protective devices are recommended
when engineering controls are not likely to
protect against inhaling infectious airborne drop-
let nuclei (e.g., in TB isolation rooms, treatment
rooms in which cough-inducing or aerosol-
generating procedures are performed, and
ambulances during the transport of infectious TB
patients) (13). The respiratory protective devices
used in these settings should have a filter
efficiency   ³ 95% with an obtainable face-seal
leakage not greater than 10% (13). The efficiency
of standard cup-shaped surgical masks in
preventing the inhalation of droplet nuclei with a
diameter of 1 to 5  mm is less than 50% (11) with
a face-seal leakage of 0% to 20% (35). Since 1990,
the use of particulate respirators including
HEPA masks tested to filter 99.97% of 0.3  mm
particles with a face-seal leakage less than 2%
has been recommended (13).
 Because of the very high costs of HEPA
masks, the breathing difficulties they may cause,
and the odd appearance of people wearing them,
which may have a psychological impact on patients,
the recommendation for personal respiratory
devices is the most controversial aspect of
existing TB guidelines. Reported cases of TB and
skin-test conversions among health-care workers
have led many to conclude that HEPA respirators
are justified. On the other hand, many believe
that less stringent personal protective devices,
such as dust/mist respirators, may provide
sufficient protection, with less discomfort and
lower cost (31). New certification rules (42 CFR
84) have been recently approved that allow the
use of dust/mist respirators, in addition to HEPA
respirators, in TB control settings (36).
The Model
In the case of an airborne infection outbreak
in a single room (e.g., a hospital room) of volume
V, where a certain number I0 ³ 1 of infective
persons and S0 of susceptible persons are present
at initial time t = 0, the number of susceptible
persons  can be expressed as a function of the
time interval from the beginning of the exposure
(the time of exposure t, measured in minutes),
the rate at which quanta are produced by the
infective persons (the infection rate q), and the
number of effective or equivalent air changes (AC)
in the unit time (the disinfection rate C) (24).
The following assumptions (4,24,25) are
taken into consideration: differences in sus-
ceptibility are neglected; the rate at which
quanta of infection are added to the air by
infectious persons is considered constant; the
latent period of the disease is longer than the
time scale of the model, and the number of
infective persons in the room is constant; droplet
nuclei are instantaneously and evenly distributed
in the room; droplet nuclei are assumed to be
removed by fresh air ventilation of the room and
ultraviolet irradiation at a constant rate; fresh
air is at the same temperature and pressure as
the air already present in the room; and the
number of infected persons is proportional to the
number of encounters between susceptible per-
sons and quanta of infection, (and the encounter
rate is proportional to both the number of
susceptible persons and quanta of infection in the
room [law of mass action]).
If the constant of proportionality between the
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susceptible persons times the number of quanta
of infection Q is the ratio between the pulmonary
ventilation p (we assume p = 0.01 m3/min) and the
volume V of the room, the following equations can
be derived:
with the initial conditions
The solution of  equation 1 - equation 2 is
The percentage of PPD conversion among
health-care workers is the following:
The rate of production of quanta of infection
during each outbreak is not known a priori.
Therefore, we do not know the real value of q
during a specific epidemic. However, it can be
derived a posteriori when the number S of
susceptible persons who were not infected is
known. In fact, solving equation S(t,q,C) =  S with
respect to q, with S given by formula 3 yields
By substituting the given values of p, V, S0, S,
t, and C in the right-hand side of  formula 6, we
obtain the value for q during each epidemic.
In this article, we simulate the adoption of
various environmental control strategies (e.g.,
HEPA filtration devices or UVGI combined with
ventilation) by giving suitable values to the
parameter C. Also, we simulate the adoption of
personal protective devices (e.g., surgical masks,
dust/mist respirators, and HEPA masks) by
scaling the rate at which quanta of infection are
breathed (pulmonary ventilation p), which
depends both on the mask’s filter efficiency and
face-seal leakage. If the masks adopted have a
filter efficiency of X% and a face-seal leakage of
Y%, then we can describe the effective filter
efficiency of the mask as Z%, with Z = (X-XY/100).
The scaling factor for p, therefore, is (100-Z)%.
For example, dust/mist respirators should
have a filter efficiency X% equal to 95% and a
face-seal leakage Y% not greater than 10%; then,
their effective filter efficiency is Z = X-XY/100 =
85.5%, and the scaling factor for p is (100-Z)% =
14.5%. We derive a scaling factor of 60% and 3%
for surgical and HEPA masks, respectively (13).
Moreover, we assume C = 6 ACH (0.1 AC/min) for
general ventilation alone, and C = 18 ACH (0.3
AC/min) or C = 45 ACH (0.75 AC/min) when
HEPA filtration or UVGI is adopted in com-
bination with ventilation (34).
Model Application
We consider two types of nosocomial
exposure to TB infection: exposure during high-
risk procedures and exposure during normal
working conditions on a ward where a source of
TB infection is present. Using data from pub-
lished TB outbreaks among health-care workers
and assuming the use of different environmental
control strategies (general ventilation, HEPA
filtration, UVGI) and respiratory protective
devices (surgical masks, dust/mist respirators,
HEPA masks), we derive the percentage of PPD
conversions that can occur.
High-Risk Procedures
We use data from four published TB out-
breaks during which health-care workers were
infected while performing bronchoscopy (7), jet
irrigation of a thigh abscess (9), autopsy (10), and
intubation (8) (Table 1). The values for q vary
from six (7) to 514 (8) quanta per minute (qpm),
indicating a high level of infectiveness of the
index case in each outbreak. The patient with the
highest rate of quanta production was considered
a dangerous disseminator of TB (8).
Table 2 shows the percentage of PPD conver-
sions that can occur during four procedures (bron-
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different environmental control strategies were
adopted, with and without the adoption of surgical
masks, dust/mist respirators, or HEPA masks.
The percentage of PPD conversions that can
occur as a function of the time of exposure t
during the least risky procedure—bronchoscopy—
if different environmental control strategies were
adopted, no personal protective devices were
used, and the time of exposure varied from 50 to
400 minutes is shown in Figure 1.
Normal Working Conditions
We consider an MDR-TB outbreak that
occurred on an HIV ward (21). During the initial
period, the percentage of PPD conversions among
health-care workers was 28%. Inadequate TB
control programs or facilities (delays in TB
diagnosis and in determining drug susceptibility
and inadequate patient isolation precautions)
facilitated the transmission. Administrative mea-
sures similar to those subsequently recommended
(37) were implemented on the HIV ward, and
early follow-up period showed a decrease in PPD
conversions among healthcare workers (18%),
who were required to wear surgical masks.
The actual time of exposure during the initial
period is not available. Assuming that the ratio
between the time of exposure tin and the time
span Tin=150 days of the initial period (January–
May 1990) is equal to the ratio between the time
of exposure tef=135 days (average between 139
and 129 days) and the time span Tef=270 days of
the early follow-up period (June 1990–February
1991), we assume that tin=Tin ´ tef/Tef @ 75 days.
The remaining data are
summarized in Table 3.
We calculate the rate of
infection in the initial period
to be q = 0.006; and after
administrative control
measures were implemented,
it decreased to q = 0.003 in the
early follow-up period.
Administrative control mea-
sures decreased the rate of
infection by 50%, thus con-
firming their key role in
preventing TB transmission.
Figure 2 shows the per-
centage of PPD conversions
predicted to occur during the




Table 1. Nosocomial TB outbreaks involving health-care workers who performed high-risk procedures
Pulmonary Room No. of No. of Exposure Infection Disinfection
ventilation volume susceptible uninfected time rate rate
p(m3/min) V(m3) persons S0 persons S t (min) q (qpm) C (ACH)
Bronchoscopy 10-2   200 13 3 150   6   1.26
Abscess irrigation   6 x 10-3a   200b   5 1 150b 38    6b
Autopsy 10-2   200b   4 0c 150b 94 11
Intubation   6 x 10-3a 3000   3 1   66 514    2.4d
aSurgical masks were adopted.
bEstimated value; actual data are not available
cWe assumed S=0.001@ 0.
dIn the emergency department where this outbreak developed, 60% of the air was recirculated without filtration; we assumed an airflow rate of 6
ACH, obtaining an effective disinfection rate equal to 40% of 6 ACH.
Table 2. Percentage of purified protein derivative conversions predicted to occur
during various procedures, by using various environmental control strategies and
respiratory protective devices
Abscess
Bronchoscopy  irrigation Autopsy Intubation
Control q=6, q=38, q=90, q=514,
measuresa t=150 minb t=150 min t=150 min t=66 min
GV 34.3 93 99.9 61.7
GV+HF 13.6 60.5 90 30.1
GV+UVGI   5.8 31.4 60.5 13.7
GV+SM 22.3 79.7 98.1 43.8
GV+HF+SM   8.4 42.7 74.8 19.3
GV+UVGI+SM   3.5 20.2 42.8   8.5
GV+DMR   5.9 32 61.5 13
GV+HF+DMR   2.1 12.6 28.3   5.1
GV+UVGI+DMR   0.9   5.3 12.6   2.1
GV+HM   1.3   7.7 17.9   2.8
GV+HF+HM   0.4   2.7   6.7   1.1
GV+UVGI+HM   0.2   1.1   2.8   0.4
aGV=general ventilation; HF=HEPA filtration; SM=surgical masks; DMR=dust/mist
respirators; HM=HEPA masks
bq=infection rate; t=exposure time.
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Conclusions
Our mathematical model indicates that a
certain number of persons exposed to a source of
TB infection will be infected in spite of all pre-
cautions. Nevertheless, if the infection rate is
known, this number can be kept low by
increasing the disinfection rate and decreasing
the time of exposure.
We have evaluated the probability of
acquiring TB infection under various exposure
conditions and found that the efficacy of
environmental control strategies depends on the
duration of exposure and the infection rate. In
particular, if the recommended levels of airflow
are the only means of reducing the concentration
of droplet nuclei in a room, they can neither
eliminate TB contagion nor provide tolerable
value for the risk of contagion. If HEPA filtration
or UVGI is combined with general ventilation,
protection against TB
transmission is ensured at
low infection rates, espe-
cially for brief exposures.
As the infection rate
increases, higher disinfection
rates appear less and less
effective in reducing the
risk for transmission, and
in situations of very inten-
sive exposure, not even
HEPA filtration or  UVGI
combined with general
ventilation can keep the
risk for transmission low
enough. In these circum-
Table 3. Nosocomial TB outbreaks involving health-care workers under normal working conditions
Pulmonary Room No. of No. of Exposure Infection Disinfection
ventilation volume susceptible uninfected time rate rate
p (m3/min) V (m3) persons So persons S t (days) q (qpm) C (ACH)
Initial period 10-2 200a 25 18   75 0.006 6
Early follow-
  up period   6 x 10-3b 200a 17 14 135 0.003 6
aEstimated value; actual data are not available.
bSurgical masks were adopted.
Figure 2. Percentage of PPD conversions predicted to occur on the HIV ward during
the initial period, if different environmental control strategies were adopted and with
and without the adoption of surgical masks (SM), dust/mist respirators (DMR), or
HEPA masks (HM).
Figure 1. Percentage of PPD conversions predicted to occur as
a function of time of exposure t during bronchoscopy, if different
environmental control strategies were adopted, no personal
protective devices were used, and the time of exposure varied
from 50 to 400 minutes.
q = 6
0
q = 0.006, t = 75 days
stances, respiratory protec-
tive  devices may be used to
protect health-care workers
from inhaling droplet nuclei.
The adoption of HEPA341 Vol. 3, No. 3, July–September 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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masks would provide nearly complete protection,
even for long exposures, if used together with
HEPA filtration or UVGI. Neverthless, the
efficacy of these control mea-sures decreases as
the infectivity of the source case increases;
therefore, the only control measures that
significantly reduce the infection rate are
administrative.
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